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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is a complaint which is timely filed but which names as the only defendant

a non-entity not capable of being sued eligible for refiling pursuant to Utah Code §78-1240 when it was dismissed without prejudice after the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that a plaintiff may continually

avoid the statute of limitations by filing successive complaints, so long as each refiling
occurs within one year of the most recent dismissal?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that new parties not named in

the original complaint may be added after a statute of limitations has run, thereby
avoiding the expired four-year statute of limitations?

OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is referenced as 1999 UT App 342.
Petitioner is not aware of any other reference to the Court of Appeals decision.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a), the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction
over the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this matter which was entered on December
1
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2", 1999. Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Utah Code §78-12-40 (1953), otherwise known as the savings statute, is the
controlling statutory provision in this case. It states as follows:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited whether by law or contract for
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a slip and fall case arising out of plaintiff s alleged injuries she received in
1988 while traveling with her daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a
professional office complex in Salt Lake County. Plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell on
some ice, sustaining back injuries.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts

On May 23, 1997, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court alleging
that on December 31, 1988 she was injured in a slip and fall accident that occurred on
premises owned by defendants. (R. 1-2) This was not plaintiffs first attempt to pursue
litigation over this incident. In fact, plaintiff had filed three previous complaints, all in

2
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Third District Court, each seeking relief for her alleged injuries stemming from the
December 31, 1988 incident. (R. 2-5) Only the first complaint was timely filed within
the applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries, which is four years. (R. 2, 5362)
However, each of the first three complaints were dismissed without prejudice. The
first two were dismissed pursuant to motions filed by parties not named in the actions but
who were served with process. In the first and second actions plaintiff named as the sole
defendant "Willowcreek Plaza," which in reality is merely the name on the building
where plaintiffs slip and fall occurred. The third complaint was voluntarily dismissed by
plaintiff. (R. 5,15) When plaintiff filed her fourth complaint naming new defendants not
named in the original complaint, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (R. 12)
Defendants' motion argued that plaintiff was only entitled to refile her complaint once
under Utah's savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953) and that even if
she was entitled to multiple refilings, she could not name new parties who were not
named in the original complaint or who did not have an identity of interest with the
original defendant. (R. 15-20).
The Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted defendants' motion. Since he
considered matters outside the pleadings, defendant's motion to dismiss was treated as a
motion for summary judgment. (R. 92/32 & 83) The order granting summary judgment
was signed on April 8,1998. (R. 82)
3
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Plaintiff appealed Judge Hanson's Order granting summary judgment on May 7,
1998. On December 2, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment,
and remanded the case for trial. (Court of Appeals opinion, attached hereto as Addendum

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs complaint alleges that she was injured in a slip and fall that

occurred on the premises of a business complex known as "Willowcreek Plaza" on
December 31,1988.
2.

(R. 2)

On or about November 20, 1992, nearly four years after the incident and

only 38 days short of the expiration of the four-year statute of limitation set forth at Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1953), plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third District Court.
(R. 3, 53)
3.

This first of four complaints named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek

Plaza." (R.3)
4.

Plaintiff served her first complaint on Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., the owner

of the premises at the time the complaint was filed. (R. 15, 71) See, also Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389.1390 (Utah 1996).
5.

However, Willowcreek Plaza, L.C., did not own the property at the time of

the alleged incident and instead had purchased it from an interim owner who had
purchased it, Valley Bank and Dime Savings Bank who jointly owned the premises at the
4
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time of plaintiff s slip and fall. (R. 72-73)
6.

Willowcreek Plaza L.C. filed a motion to dismiss shortly thereafter arguing

that it did not own the building at the time of the incident and that the named defendant
"Willowcreek Plaza" was merely the name on the building and did not exist as an entity
that could sue or be sued. (R. 3, 15, 72-73)
7.

The Honorable Judge Leslie Lewis granted the motion to dismiss that in

fact "Willowcreek Plaza" did not have the capacity to be sued and that Willowcreek Plaza
L.C. did not own the premises at the time of the incident. (Court of Appeals Opinion,
paragraph 4)
8.

The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint without prejudice was

signed on September 22,1993, over nine months after the statute of limitations expired.
(R.3-4)
9.

Plaintiff then filed her second complaint on September 17, 1993 and again

named as the sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 4 & 56)
10.

However, this time plaintiff served Valley Bank. (R. 4 & 15)

11.

Because they were not named as parties, Valley Bank and Dime Savings

moved to dismiss on the grounds that they were not doing business as "Willowcreek
Plaza." Id.
12.

Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that the banks were in fact doing

business as "Willowcreek Plaza" pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
5
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Procedure. (R. 73)
13.

The Honorable Judge John A. Rokich ruled that the banks were indeed not

doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and as such plaintiff could not bring suit against
them in that name. (R. 4) He therefore dismissed plaintiffs second complaint without
prejudice. I d
14.

The order dismissing this second lawsuit without prejudice was entered on

January 17, 1994. I d
15.

Plaintiff then filed her third complaint on January 6,1994, this time naming

Valley Bank and Dime Bank. (R. 5, 59)
16.

Plaintiff never pursued this third action, and instead chose to pursue an

appeal of Judge Rokich's decision dismissing the second complaint. (R. 5)
17.

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her third complaint on February 22, 1994.

(Court of Appeals Opinion, footnote 2)
18.

Plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of her second complaint was unsuccessful

on two separate occasions.
19.

Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing

that Valley Bank was not doing business as "Willowcreek Plaza" and therefore could not
be sued in that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App.
1995); see also (R. 63-65)
20.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted.
6
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Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).
21.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling. Hebertson v.

Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); see also (R. 71-74)
22.

Plaintiff thereafter filed her fourth complaint on May 23, 1997. (R. 1-7)

23.

Defendants again moved to dismiss plaintiffs fourth complaint arguing that

the savings statute allows only one refiling and that the statute of limitations therefore
barred plaintiff s fourth complaint. (R. 12-20)
24.

Defendants further argued that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than

one refiling she could not add or name new parties not named in her first complaint. IcL
25.

In opposition, plaintiff argued that the Utah savings statute allows for more

than one refiling and that regardless of how she referred to defendants in her various
complaints, her cause of action had always been the same. (R. 23-33)
26.

Plaintiff also argued that the banks were doing business as "Willowcreek

Plaza" and that her efforts in substituting the banks' names as the designated defendants
in her fourth complaint did not impair her right to rely on the savings statute. (R. 29)
27.

Plaintiff also informed the trial court in her written opposition to

defendants' motion to dismiss that she had initiated a legal malpractice lawsuit against
her original attorney in the Third District Court styled Hebertson v. Dalby et. al.. Civil
No. 960908024, filed November 20,1996, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding.
(R. 27)
7
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28.

After reading the briefs and listening to the oral argument of the parties,

The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs
complaint on March 13, 1998. (R. 92/32)
29.

Because matters outside the pleadings were considered, the trial court

treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ruled that plaintiff was
entitled to only one refiling after her first complaint was dismissed. (R. 83)
30.

The trial court further ruled that even if plaintiff was entitled to more than

one refiling, she could not name new parties after the expiration of the statute of
limitations. (R. 83)
31.

The order dismissing plaintiffs fourth complaint was entered on April 8,

1998 and plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on May 7, 1998. LcL.
32.

On December 2, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary

judgment and remanded the case for trial. (Court of Appeals Opinion, paragraph 20)
ARGUMENT
1.

Plaintiffs first complaint naming a non-existent defendant is a
complete nullity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 therefore does not apply
and Plaintiffs three subsequent refillings are barred by the statute of
limitations.

Plaintiffs first complaint was filed on November 24, 1992, just 38 days prior to
the four-year statute of limitations deadline for filing litigation with respect to the slip and
fall she claims occurred on December 31,1988. (R. 14-15) That complaint named as the

8
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sole defendant "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 15) Because Willowcreek Plaza was a nonentity and was incapable of suing or being sued, plaintiffs first complaint was dismissed
pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the new owners of the building who had been
served with process.1
The order dismissing plaintiffs first complaint was issued in September of 1993,
well over nine months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Because that
complaint never named the appropriate defendant and in fact named a defendant that did
not exist, the savings statute found at Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953) cannot operate to
preserve a claim against a party who was never named, served, or joined as a party to the
original action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation.
The case of Estate ofHaro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
demonstrates this principle in action. In Haro, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal of a wrongful death lawsuit due to the would-be claimant's failure to name a
plaintiff that had the capacity to sue on behalf of the heirs of the deceased. Plaintiffs had
sued in the name of the "Estate of Martin Haro." I d They filed their complaint six
weeks before the statute of limitations ran. IcL
The defendants in Haro thereafter filed a motion to dismiss after the statute of
limitations had run arguing that plaintiff had brought the suit in the name of an entity that
1

Even if plaintiff had named Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. in the first action the complaint
would have been dismissed anyway because they did not own the property at the time of
plaintiffs accident.
9
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did not have the capacity to sue. Plaintiffs moved to substitute the proper party pursuant
to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion to
substitute and dismissed the suit, ruling that plaintiffs had not initiated suit within the two
year statute of limitations. Id The Haro court held that since the suit was brought by a
party that lacked the capacity to bring the claim, the lawsuit was "a nullity" and therefore
there was no suit or "cause of action in which to substitute parties." Id. at 879. Thus,
even though the original suit was timely filed, the error in naming the proper party
effectively wiped that suit clean from the books resulting in the expiration of the statute
of limitations which barred further refilings. LdL at 879, n. 2.
Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), is also on point. In Dunn, the original
plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death lawsuit over the death of a purported relative.
When it was determined that the plaintiff in the original action was in fact not related to
the decedent, the case was dismissed without prejudice.2 Id Thereafter, a new second
action was commenced, this time naming as plaintiffs the proper heirs. However, the
second action was clearly filed after the two year statute of limitations had run. IdL at
572. The trial court dismissed the second complaint holding that the statute of limitations
barred the second action and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The parties in the first
action were not the same as those named in the second action and § 78-12-40 therefore

2

As in this case, the original suit in Dunn was dismissed well after the statute of
limitations for wrongful death claims expired. Id at p. 571-72
10
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did not apply and could not be used to resurrect their claims. Id.
The Haro and Dunn decisions are consistent with case law from other jurisdictions
who have addressed this issue from the perspective of a wrongly named defendant. (See
e.g. McCoy Enterprises v. Vaughn, 268 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. App. 1980); Jordan v.
Commissioners of Bristol County. 167 N.E. 652 (Mass. 1929); Day v. NLO Inc.. 798
F.Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
Plaintiffs efforts to properly name and serve defendants here are untimely and
improper. Plaintiff may not renew an action under the savings statute that never existed
in the first place. She cannot now sue the proper defendants having failed to name, serve,
or join them as defendants in the initial action prior to the running of the statute of
limitations. The Court of Appeals' decision in this case is in conflict with the Haro and
Dunn decisions, and should be reversed by this Court.
2.

Even if the savings statute applies, plaintiff is only entitled to one refiling of her complaint, not four.

As indicated in the procedural history, this appeal is from plaintiffs fourth
complaint. Therefore, even if §78-12-40 were applicable and plaintiff was entitled to
refile her complaint after the first one was dismissed, the savings statute only allows for
one refiling, not three.
Utah's savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
11
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such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for
commencement the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or
if he dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure.
I d Perusal of this language indicates that the intent of the statue is to allow one refiling,
not three as plaintiff has done here.
This question has not been directly addressed by Utah appellate courts, and is an
important question which should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court. The Court of
Appeals in dicta has previously indicated that plaintiff is only entitled to one refiling.
Specifically, in Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d 1216, the Honorable Judge Judith
Billings writing for a unanimous panel stated in a footnote that §78-12-40 allowed for
only one re-filing.
Although we refrain from addressing the merits of whether
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 permits unlimited successive
dismissals and refilings, we note that many of the courts that
have been faced with a similar question have concluded that
in the interest of finality and judicial economy, a plaintiff is
entitled to only one refiling pursuant to a savings statute. See
e.g.. Hunter v.Ward 15 F.2d 843, 844 (8th Cir. 1926);
Marangio v. Shop Rite Supermarkets, Inc.. 11 Conn.App.
156, 55 A.2d 1389,1391 (1987), cert denied, 204 Conn. 809,
528 A.2d 1155 (1987); Sylvester v. Steinberg, 152 Ill.App.3rd
962,105 Ill.Dec. 902, 903, 505 N.E.2d 28,29 (1987); United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 175 Okla. 475, 53 P.2d 284,
288(1935). This conclusion is consistent with the language
of the Utah saving statute as the statute speaks in terms of a
singular rather than multiple dismissals: "a new action," "the
reversal or failure".
12
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I d at 1221, n. 10 (emphasis in original).
Many other states have held that only one refiling is allowed under a savings
statute: Morrow v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. Co.. 66 S.E. 186 (S.C. 1909)(interpreting
South Carolina law); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden. 475, P.2d 284, 288
(1935)(interpreting Oklahoma law); Turner v. N.C. & St. L. Railway. 285 S.W.2d 122
(Tenn. 1955)(interpreting Tennessee law); Worley v. Pierce. 440 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. App.
1994)(interpreting Georgia law); Rogozinski v. American Food Service Equip., 643 A.2d
300 (Conn. App. 1994)(interpreting Connecticut law); Cady v. Harlan, 442 S.W.2d 517
(Mo. 1969)(interpreting Missouri law); Hunter v. Ward. 15 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1926)(interpreting Arkansas law); Sylvester v. Steinberg. 505 N.E.2d 28 (111. App., 4 Dist.
1987)(interpreting Illinois law); Bush v. Cole. 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio 1912) (interpreting
Ohio law).
Language from the Swyden opinion addresses the philosophical underpinnings of
this majority position which allows only on refilling, not multiple refilings.
We must remember that the grace period is not a release of
the original limitation, nor even an extension thereof for all
purposes, but is only a conditional, limited extension granted
plaintiff because the suit which he did file in time, consumed
some time in court before dismissal, carrying him beyond the
original limitation date, possibly without any fault of his own.
That he could file and dismiss as often as he desired within
the original period of limitation has nothing to do with it, for
at that time there was no bar at all. Once, however, he passes
the bar he is on the law's own time, and is permitted to ignore
the statute only by virtue of legislative exception especially
13
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created for the occasion. Thus, good reason appears to
support the general rule and inteipretation of such statutes, to
the effect that the legislatures of the various states, in
extending litigants the privilege of filing actions out of time,
mean just what they express by the words "commence a new'
action,"and that they do not thereby intend that plaintiffs may
file as many new actions as they desire, all within the year.
Had that been their intention, then such statutes would have
been worded in the language of the ordinary statutes of
limitation, with minor changes. To give such an
interpretation as desired by plaintiff would do violence to the
letter, spirit, meaning, and purpose of the statute.
Swyden 53 P.2d at 2883.
In Pintavalle v. Valkanos. 581 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut Supreme
Court stated that plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute "would have the effect of
permitting a potentially limitless extension of the time to file succeeding actions. This
would defeat the basic purpose of statutes of limitation, namely, promoting finality in the
litigation process. Although § 52-592 is a remedial statute and must be construed
liberally; it should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes of limitation virtually
meaningless." IdL at 1052 (citations omitted).
If accepted, plaintiffs arguments here would essentially render the statute of
limitations meaningless. It should be noted that §78-12-40 is found within the heart of

3

Although the facts in Swyden involved multiple refilings (three not including the
original) within the one year savings period, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited affirmatively to
other cases where the first refilling occurred outside the original one year savings period. Thus,
it does not matter if the second or third refilings occurred within or without the savings period
because the statute allowed but one refilling.
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the Limitation of Actions chapter of the Judicial Code. It therefore must be construed and
harmonized to work within the overall purpose of the act.
Plaintiff has exercised her one opportunity to file a lawsuit beyond the applicable
statute of limitations assuming § 78-12-40 applies. That filing was dismissed. Plaintiff
sought appellate review and obtained two opinions from both appellate courts of this state
denying her claims and upholding the dismissal. Since plaintiff is now on her third
refilling from which this appeal is taken, she has clearly exceeded the ambit of § 78-12-40
and the trial court's ruling should be upheld.
3.

Whether Plaintiff is allowed one or multiple refilings under § 78-12-40,
she nevertheless cannot name new parties who were not named in the
original complaint and who have no identity of interest to the
defendant named in her first complaint.

Plaintiff argues that her efforts to name the correct defendants in this action should
relate back to the first complaint which was filed within the applicable statute of
limitations. However, the law is clear that one may not add new parties to a lawsuit and
have that amendment relate back to the original filing for purposes of preserving the
statute of limitations.
At first blush, plaintiffs arguments appear to rely on Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This rule governs the relation back of amendments to pleadings and
allows a party to amend their existing pleadings and have them relate back to original
complaint or filing. However, plaintiff has not argued Rule 15(c) and rightly so. Case
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law explicitly states that Rule 15(c) does not generally allow amendments to the
pleadings to include new parties since such amendments would amount to the assertion of
a new cause of action and defeat the very purpose of a statute of limitation: Perry, 681
P.2dat218.
However, a narrow exception to this general rule allows new parties to be added
and related back to the original complaint where there is an identity of interest between
the old and new parties. Id at 217. Here, there is no identity of interest between
defendants who actually owned the property at the time of the accident and "Willowcreek
Plaza", a name on a building and the only named defendant in the original complaint and
plaintiffs first refilling. "Willowcreek Plaza" is a non-entity. It cannot sue or be sued.
Furthermore, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have rejected plaintiffs prior
assertions that the banks were doing business as Willowcreek Plaza. See Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza. 895 P.2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(cert. granted at 910 P.2d 425).
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza. 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996).
Williams v. Zortman Mining. Inc., 914 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1996) is on point.
In Zortman, the plaintiff sued the parent company of a wholly owned subsidiary
corporation. Zortman actually was employed by the subsidiary and his claims of
discrimination in the workplace was in reality against his employer, not its parent
company. The federal court dismissed Zortman's claims for his attempt to "manipulate
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court." I d at 972. He thereafter sued the
16
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subsidiary (his employer and the proper party) in state court after the statute of limitations
expired. Id.
Citing Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville. Inc.. 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991), the Zortman court stated : "We

agree that the 'savings statute' does not

apply to save or 'renew' a complaint against a party not named in the original complaint."
Id. at 973. Zortman goes on to agree with McCoy referenced elsewhere in this brief that
the second suit should be dismissed even if the proper corporate defendant had actual
notice of the first suit since the first suit failed to name it or a company with whom it held
a sufficient identity of interest and the statute of limitations expired before the proper
party was sued. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the equities of the identity of interest rule and the general
principle of fairness dictate that cases ought to be heard on the merits, not disposed of
based on technical applications of the law to the facts at hand. While defendants would
agree with this principle as a general rule, such equities do not apply to the requirements
of naming the correct parties and satisfying the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs naming of the wrong parties is more than a "form of pleading error". As
a Massachucets court explained in Jordan v. Commissioners of Bristol County, 167 N.E.
652 (Mass. 1929):
However, plaintiff, cause of action and defendant cannot be
regarded as "form" within this definition. Misnomer or
misdescription of any of these substantive elements may be
17
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"matter of form," but the mistaken choice of a defendant
unrelated to the subject-matter of the case is not merely a
formal error.
Id. at 654. Utah courts agree with this position. See, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co.T 681 P.2d214, 217 (Utah 1984).
Rule 15(c) does not allow the naming of new parties to relate back to the original
filing absent an identity of interest between the old and new parties. See also. Haro, 887
P.2d at 879, n.2. (Plaintiffs first suit was a nullity and plaintiff could not revive their
action after the statute of limitations period where the first suit was brought by a plaintiff
who lacked the capacity to sue.) .,,,*.
While this case represents the improper naming of a defendant, the logic of Haro
and Perry are on point and demonstrate that naming the proper party is critical to
maintaining an action and such errors is pleading cannot be dismissed as minor or
excusable under the relaxed "form-of-pleading" rules.
Plaintiffs lawsuit filed against "Willowcreek Plaza" was a nullity. It was brought
against an entity that did not exist and lacked the capacity to be sued. As such there is no
complaint to which any attempted amendment or addition of new parties could relate
back to sufficient to avoid the statute of limitations which ran shortly after plaintiff filed
her first complaint and years before she finally named the proper defendants. While
plaintiff likely views these arguments as unfair and harsh, they nevertheless comport with
Utah law and the purpose of statutes of limitation. See, Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 575
18
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(Utah 1993) (statutes of limitations "do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply
provide that if an action is not filed within the specified time, the remedy is deemed to
have been waived

The barring of the remedy is caused by a plaintiffs failure to take

reasonable steps to assert the cause of action within the time afforded by statute.").
In conclusion, plaintiff failed to take "reasonable steps" to assert her cause of
action when she filed her first complaint six years ago. She named a non-entity that
lacked the capacity to be sued and she served an entity that had no involvement or
relationship to the accident in question. This utter failure on her part to properly initiate
her lawsuit when she or her counsel knew they were on the eve of the statute of
limitations expiration date is fatal to her claims and all other efforts including the second,
third and fourth complaints cannot revive an action that by law is a nullity and was never
filed in compliance with the statute of limitations in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff never complied with the statute of limitations in the first place insofar as
these defendants are concerned. Even if the savings statute applies to her first dismissal
she is entitled to only one refilling, not three. Finally, her efforts to correct her mistake in
naming the wrong defendants through amendment or relation back to her original
complaint are not proper. Utah law clearly prohibits her efforts to add new parties in
subsequent refilings.

Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment against plaintiffs

complaint for statute of limitations purposes should be affirmed, and the Court of Appeals
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opinion should be reversed.
DATED this tf* day of January, 2000.
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

Richard K. Glauser
D. Joseph Cartwright
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ORME, Judge:
Hi
Plaintiff Randi Hebertson appeals the trial court's award of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Bank One, Utah, formerly
known as Valley Bank & Trust Company (Bank One), and Dime Savings
Bank of New York, FSB (Dime Savings). Because we conclude that
the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), permits a
plaintiff to refile timely successive actions after each is
dismissed, so long as the dismissal is not on the merits and the
refiled action is substantially the same as the previous action,
we reverse.
BACKGROUND
112
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here
the appellant[] ." Parker v. Dodqion, 971 P.2d 496, 496-97 (Utah
1998) .
1|3
This appeal affords this court a second occasion to consider
Ms. Hebertson's attempt to recover for injuries sustained in
1988. On December 31 of that year, while accompanying her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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daughter to an appointment at Willowcreek Plaza, a professional
office complex in Salt Lake County, Hebertson slipped and fell on
some ice, sustaining an injury to her back that required multiple
surgeries. Within the next three days, Hebertson contacted the
building manager, who referred her to the building's insurance
carrier, State Farm Insurance. Having been unable to reach a
settlement of her claim with the insurer, Hebertson filed a
complaint against "Willowcreek Plaza" approximately one month
before the statute of limitations was to expire and served
process upon a manager employed by Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. As it
turned out, however, although Willowcreek Plaza, L.C. owned the
office complex when the complaint was filed, at the time of the
"accident it was owned by Bank One and Dime Savings, which had
acquired it by foreclosure.1
1)4
On the motion of Willowcreek Plaza, L . C , the trial court
dismissed this first action without prejudice. Relying on the
savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996), Hebertson
filed a second complaint, again naming "Willowcreek Plaza" in the
caption as the defendant, but naming in the body of the complaint
and serving Bank One and Dime Savings. See Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 1996). Bank One and
Dime Savings contended they could not be sued under the name
Willowcreek Plaza and moved to dismiss. The trial court granted
the motion. See id. Although Hebertson objected to dismissal of
this action, she did not move to amend the complaint to conform
the parties named in the caption to those described in the
complaint's body. Rather, she insisted that Bank One and Dime
Savings were doing business under the name Willowcreek Plaza and
thus could be sued under that name. See id. See generally Utah
R. Civ. P. 17(d). In Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d
839, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this court rejected that
contention and upheld the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed our decision.2 See Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923
P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996).
%5
Within a year of the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
second complaint's dismissal, and again relying on the savings
statute, Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, naming Bank One
1. At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for defendants
confirmed that defendants and Willowcreek, L.C. had the same
insurer and attorney.
2. After dismissal of the second complaint, Hebertson again
relied on the savings statute and filed a third complaint, naming
Bank One and Dime Savings in the caption as defendants. However,
electing to appeal the second complaint's dismissal, Hebertson
never served and, ultimately, voluntarily dismissed the third
complaint.
980226-CA
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and Dime Savings as defendants in both the caption and body. On_
June 16, 1997, Bank One and Dime Savings were served with a
summons and a copy of this fourth complaint. Bank One' and Dime
Savings moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the savings statute did
not apply beyond a single refiling and the action was therefore
barred by the statute of limitations. Hebertson opposed the
motion, arguing that the savings statute allows multiple
refilings. Because it considered matters outside the pleadings,
the trial court correctly treated the motion as one for summary
judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b), 56(c); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Utah 1996), and granted
'summary judgment in favor of Bank One and Dime Savings. The
trial court ruled that the savings statute allows only a single
refiling and that even if multiple refilings were allowed,
Hebertson could not include new defendants in the refiled action.
Hebertson again appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
%6
" ' Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.' Because the question of whether
summary judgment is appropriate is a question of law, we accord
no deference to the trial court." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d
496, 497 (Utah 1998) (quoting Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)).
MULTIPLE REFILINGS UNDER THE SAVINGS STATUTE
%7
This case squarely presents us for the first time with the
issue of whether the savings statute permits a plaintiff to file
more than one new action after a dismissal not on the merits.3
To resolve this issue we must construe Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40
(1996) .
^18
"In matters of statutory construction, ' [t]he best evidence
of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting
[an] Act is the plain language of the Act.'" Platts v. Parents
3. Although in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State
University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this court
intimated that section 78-12-40 may not permit successive
refilings, see id. at 1221 n.10, we concluded the issue was not
ripe for adjudication and expressly stated "it would not be
proper for this court to render a definitive opinion on the
permissibility of refiling an action under Utah Code Ann. § 7812-40 more than once." Id. at 1220-21.
980226-CA
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Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)).
See also Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. ,
964 P.2d 335, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("' [W]here the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, [the court] will not look
beyond it to divine legislative intent.1") (quoting Utah Sign,
Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633-34 (Utah 1995)).
Moreover, we "assume that 'each term in the statute was used
advisedly.'" Id. (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)).
%9

The Utah savings statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year after
the reversal or failure.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996). By beginning with the word
"if," the statute suggests a s€>t of conditions will follow.4 It
then recites conditions, the occurrence of which invokes the
application of the statutory consequences. The conditions are:
(1) "any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed;" or (2) "the plaintiff
fails in such action [--i.e., any action commenced within due
time--]or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits;"
and (3) the applicable limitations period has expired. Id. See
also Hansen v. Department of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (holding savings statute did not apply where
action was dismissed within original limitations period).
1|l0 Because the first two conditions were drafted in the
disjunctive, Hebertson need only satisfy one of them and the
Third condition for the statute to apply. The third condition
was clearly satisfied here because the limitations period had
long since expired. See Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 1390. Because
there was no reversal of a judgment for Hebertson, and thus the
4. For example, Webster's defines "if" as synonymous with "in
the event that: in case" and "so long as: on condition that."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1124 (1976). Cf.
Black's Law Dictionary 746 (6th ed. 1990) ("In deeds and wills,
this word, as a rule, implies a condition precedent[.]").
980226-CA
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first condition does not apply, if Hebertson satisfies the second
alternative condition--i.e.# that "the plaintiff fails in [any
action commenced within due time] otherwise than upon the
merits"--the savings statute applies. Here, because the trial
court dismissed the second complaint without prejudice, the
action did not fail on the merits. The question remains whether
it was filed "within due time." If it was, the action commenced
with plaintiff's fourth complaint was timely because it was filed
within one year of the Utah Supreme Court's affirmance of the
dismissal of plaintiff's second complaint. If the second action
was not filed "within due time" for purposes of the savings
statute, plaintiff had no right to file the fourth complaint.
i[ll Our Supreme Court has already held that, for purposes of the
savings statute, an action is "commenced" when the new complaint
is filed. See Muir v. W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., 851 P.2d 645,
647 (Utah 1993). Further, the term "within" denotes "on the
inside or on the inner side" and "inside the bounds of a place or
region," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2627
(1976), while "due" refers to that which is "[j]ust; proper;
regular; lawful; sufficient." Black's Law Dictionary 499 (6th
ed. 1990). Hence, an "action commenced within due time" refers
to an action filed inside the period of time authorized by law.
^|12 Defendants would have us equate "action commenced within due
time" narrowly, i.e., as being an action commenced within the
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. This view
overlooks that the savings statute itself establishes a time
frame within which to file an action, indeed, an action that
would be untimely under the statute of limitations. Accordingly,
we believe that Hebertson's second action was "commenced within
due time" when she filed it within the year authorized by the
savings statute.
Hl3 The plain language of section 78-12-40 is simply no bar to
serial recourse to the savings statute. Therefore, Hebertson's
fourth action was timely because it was brought within one year
of the failure, not on the merits, of her second action, which
had been filed "within due time" under the savings statute.
Simply stated, if the Legislature meant to limit the savings
statute to a single use per cause of action, it would have
avoided general phraseology like "within due time" and stated its
intention clearly, a simple thing to do. See, e.g., Ga. Code
Ann. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1998) (providing that "this privilege of
renewal shall be exercised only once"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1105 (Supp. 1998) (authorizing refiling only for those actions
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that failed other than on the merits and were "commenced within
the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation").5
Hl4 Consistent with the dicta in Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v.
Utah State University. 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), see
supra note 3, Bank One and Dime Savings argue that the statute's
use of singular articles--i.e., "may commence a new action within
one year after the reversal or failure"--contemplates only one
refiling.6 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) (emphasis added).
5. We acknowledge that some courts in other states have reached
the opposite conclusion when reviewing their own savings
statutes. Nonetheless, because these decisions interpret
statutes with language distinct from that in our savings statute,
these interpretations are unpeirsuasive. See, e.g.. Estate of
Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 581 A.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Conn. 1990)
(holding that the multiple refilings expressly authorized by
Connecticut's savings statute must all be made within one year of
the failure of the first action, described by the statute as the
"original action"); Worley v. Pierce, 440 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that by stating the "privilege of renewal
shall be exercised only once," the savings statute permitted only
one refiling); Foster v. Pettiiohn, 213 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo.
1948) (holding that its statute allowing refiling "from time to
time, within one year" permitted multiple refilings, but not
beyond the one-year savings period). We also recognize that
other jurisdictions have determined that their statutes, which
are more similar to Utah's, do not permit multiple refilings.
See, e.g., Sylvester v. Steinberg, 505 N.E.2d 28, 29 (111. App.
Ct. 1987) (holding that the statute did not permit multiple
refilings although it "d[id] not contain express limitations on
the number of voluntary dismissals and refilings available");
Denton v. City of Atchison, 90 P. 764, 765 (Kan. 1907) (statute
did not permit successive refilings after the initial one-year
savings period); Hull v. Rich, 354 P.2d 903, 904 (Okla. 1993)
(statute permitted only one refiling). Nevertheless, we find
these decisions ultimately unpersuasive, largely because they
turn more on policy considerations than plain meaning. In Utah,
courts are not so quick to veer from a statute's plain meaning
and undertake a foray into the realm of policy. See, e.g., Olsen
v. Samuel Mclntvre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998)
("'Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language
need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations.'") (quoting World Peace Movement of Am. v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)).
6. Defendants do not address the rule of statutory construction
in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(a) (Supp. 1999), which provides
that "[t]he singular number includes the plural, and the plural
(continued...)
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We believe such an inference is neutralized by the statute's
prior reference to "any action . . . commenced within due time."
Id. (emphasis added). See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 97 (1976) (defining "any" as "one indifferently out of
more than two[J one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind"
and stating it is "used as a function word especially] in
interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is
not a particular or definite individual of the given category").
Although other courts have construed similar language to permit a
plaintiff to file only one new action, see United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 53 P.2d 284, 285-88 (Okla. 1935) (holding
that "commence a new action" did not authorize multiple
*refilings), such a result is not universal. See Sharp Bros:
Contracting Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 817 P.2d 547, 551 (Colo, Ct.
App.) (noting that "'a new action' [does not] mean only one new
action") (emphasis added), cert, denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 662
(Colo. 1991).
Hl5 We reject defendants' contention that our decision will make
the course of lawsuits uncertain or open the floodgates on the
stream of litigation. Plaintiffs have little natural interest in
filing multiple unproductive actions or paying multiple filing
fees. Moreover, the savings statute is limited to actions that
are not resolved on the merits and to circumstances where an .
action was originally brought within the limitations period.
Further, multiple refilings in cases such as these are rarely
needed because generally plaintiffs will be given the opportunity
to simply amend their complaints to remedy these kinds of
deficiencies. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), 21; Sulzen v. Williams,
977 P.2d 497, 501-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (concluding trial court
abused its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint so
that caption would name correct parties, which were described in
body). Moreover, if any action is filed "for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation," the party and/or
counsel may be sanctioned. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) .
1|l6 Because the Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of
Hebertson's second complaint occurred less than one year before
Hebertson filed her fourth complaint, that complaint was timely
under the savings statute. The terms of the savings statute do
not include a "once per customer" limitation. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in concluding that Hebertson's fourth complaint
was barred by the statute of limitations.

6.
(...continued)
the singular."
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ADDITION OF "NEW" PARTIES
Hl7 We now turn to Bank One and Dime Savings's argument that
even if we permit successive refilings under the savings statute,
Bank One and Dime Savings could not be added as new parties in
the fourth action. Their general position in this regard has
merit. Unlike statutes of limitation that provide a general time
period in which a plaintiff may file any action arising out of a
given occurrence, the savings statute affords a means only to
renew the earlier action. Consequently, the "saving statute does
not apply when the new action is brought against a different
defendant than was the first one, or by a different plaintiff."
'51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 820-21 (1970) .
See Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983) (holding that to
invoke the savings statute, the party bringing the subsequent
saved action must have been a "party to the original lawsuit who
had affirmatively sought relief therein"). Thus, the refiled
action is "new" only in the sense that it results from the filing
of a different complaint. See Black's Law Dictionary 1042 (6th
ed. 1990) (explaining that "new" "ordinarily . . . is a purely
relative term and is employed in contrasting the date, origin, or
character of one thing with the corresponding attributes of
another thing of the same kind or class"). 7
7. Equally important as relying on the statute's plain language
is the rule "that a statute should be construed as a whole, with
all of its provisions construed to be harmonious with each other
and with the overall legislative objective of the statute."
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995).
See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1996) ("The statutes . . . and all
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.");
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (" [A] ny
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify other
statutory provisions is improper."); Ferro v. Utah Dep ! t of
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting
interpretation that would "rewrite the Act and impermissibly
render [another section] a complete nullity"). Without the
requirement that the claims be substantially the same, a lazy
plaintiff could easily avoid the diligence that statutes of
limitation are meant to promote by filing an action at the
eleventh hour against anybody; then filing a notice of dismissal
before service or obtaining a dismissal for failure to prosecute,
using the extra time to figure out who to sue; and then filing a
new complaint a year later. Such a result would eviscerate our
statutes of limitation and undermine their purpose of
"requir[ing] that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut
them is still fresh" and would burden courts and parties with
"'stale' claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago
(continued...)
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Ul8 However, the prevailing view is that the prior and refiled
actions need only be substantially the same. Thus, "a change of
parties does not preclude an application of the statute where the
change is merely nominal or the interest represented in the
renewed action [is] identical with that in the original action."
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 318, at 821 (1970) . This
is consistent with the approach taken in a closely related
context. When a pleading is amended after expiration of the
limitations period, such amendment will relate back to the
original filing if it "merely restates in a different form the
cause of action originally pleaded." Id. § 234, at 787. See
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996).
'Because the basic inquiry is the same for determining whether a
"change" in defendants is within the scope of the savings statute
as it is for determining if such a change relates back under Rule
15(c), we adopt the same test.8 That is, just as with the
relation back of an amendment, a refiled action is substantially
the same as the original and is thus authorized by the savings
statute where the new and old "[p]arties have an identity of
interest [such that] 'the real parties in interest were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them
unofficially, from an early stage.'" Sulzen v. Williams, 977
P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Doxey-Lavton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976)).. See also Wilcox, 911 P.2d
at 369-70 ("'[A]n amendment which substitutes or adds new parties
. . . relat[es] back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'")
(quoting Doxey-Layton Co., 548 P.2d at 906).
Hl9 We conclude, as a matter of law, that Bank One and Dime
Savings had a sufficient identity of interest with Willowcreek
Plaza and were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings resulting
from the second complaint. Thus, the action commenced with the
fourth complaint is substantially the same as that commenced with
the second complaint and, therefore, is within the scope of
section 78-12-40. In Sulzen, we held that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying amendment to the complaint's caption to
substitute parties where the proper parties were named in the
body of the complaint and served with process. See Sulzen, 977
P.2d at 501 ("'"If the body of the complaint correctly identifies
the party . . . courts generally will allow an amendment under
7 . (...continued)
that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured."
2d Limitation of Actions § 17, at 602-03 (1970).

51 Am. Jur.

8. Significantly, both sides have applied Rule 15(c) analysis in
their briefs, thus implicitly recognizing that this approach is
appropriate.
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Rule 15 to correct technical defects in the caption.11111) (quoting
Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 370) (other citation omitted; omission in
original). This case is remarkably similar. That is/
notwithstanding the second complaint's caption, Bank One and Dime
Savings were described as defendants in the body of the complaint
and were actually served. This is sufficient notice to bring the
fourth complaint within the savings statute as a matter of law.9
CONCLUSION
K2 0 We hold that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Bank One and Dime Savings. By
its plain language, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1996) allows a
plaintiff to refile a new action each time a prior action fails
other than on the merits, provided the new action is filed within
one year of such failure. However, because the renewed action
must be substantially the same as that in the prior action, new
parties may be added only if, because of sufficient identity of
interest, the addition is not prejudicial. In this case, Bank
One and Dime Savings had such an identity of interest with
Willowcreek Plaza and no prejudice is apparent. Therefore
section 78-12-40 applies to Hebertson's fourth complaint
notwithstanding the change in the caption. Accordingly, we
reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial or
such other proceedings as may now be appropriate.

Gregory K^Orme, Judge
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WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge

9. Additional facts indicate Bank One and Dime Savings had
actual notice and reinforce this conclusion. For example, Bank
One and Dime Savings's insurance carrier had notice of
Hebertson's claim and injuries only a few days after the incident
and long before Hebertson filed any action.
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